

Generations of Antigone

An Intra-Feminist Dialogue with Beauvoir, Irigaray, and Butler

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Feminist Rereadings of Antigone

Feminist investigations of the role of Antigone have situated her within philosophical analysis and literary investigation as an emblematic figure, representative of the plight of women in history: the subject who must negotiate competing gender expectations and structural alliances, such as those of kinship and the state, with complicated yet tragic results. Insofar as she has represented “woman” – conflicted over her allegiance to her brother, her role within the family, and her commitment to “divine law” on the one hand, and her duty to the state, her commitment to “human law,” and her obligation as a woman to conform to the hetero-norms of society, on the other hand – Antigone has provided rich fodder for philosophical and literary scholarship. Feminists, including Simone de Beauvoir, Luce Irigaray, and Judith Butler, have revisited and critiqued masculinist approaches to *Antigone*, and, in particular, Hegel’s rendering, in an attempt to open up the text and the figure of Antigone to new possibilities, including the positioning of Antigone as something more than that of a tragic figure.

By positioning these feminist scholars in an intergenerational dialogue, where “generation” itself becomes a point of contention – more than a schematic of discrete historical periodization, or an antagonistic model of age stratification with its presumption of political incompatibility – we may begin the work of examining conceptual links and irreducible tensions between feminist thinkers at different political “moments”.¹ In keeping with the tripartite structure asserted by Julia Kristeva in her classic essay, “Women’s Time,” such “moments” represent modes of feminist activity linked to certain segments of history, and yet they are not strictly associated with distinct periods of linear, chronological time.² The first “generation” or political “moment” involves necessary (but insufficient) efforts towards inclusion and egalitarian reform; the second generation or political moment centers on the revaluation of that which has been

degraded or relegated to the margins, a privileging of the “feminine,” for example; and the third generation or moment entails the rigorous interrogation of constitutive frameworks and the synthesis of various strategies and positionalities – whatever is useful for feminisms’ shifting aims and purposes. As Kristeva asserts, these phases, or techniques, have always been overlapping and mutually informing. The third signifying space, or mode of feminist activity, is committed to theorizing feminism *after* the deconstruction of rigid gender binarisms and other reified oppositions, including those that support the conceptually inadequate category, “women”. It represents a convergence and a synthesis, but with no aim towards achieving uniformity, consensus, or “oneness,” unlike the teleological account of human consciousness in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the logic intrinsic to prevailing notions of time, history, and progress, to phallogocentrism itself, yet also operative within many liberatory narratives. From this space, these three thinkers, together, yield insights concerning strategies of feminist critical practice and formulations of feminist community.

Much of feminist scholarship has repeatedly returned to Hegel, not only due to Hegel’s presence within philosophical history but due to the radical potential of interrogating masculinist thought, or turning a dominant philosophical narrative, like the *Phenomenology*, against itself. Rather than evaluate which approach is “correct,” or most accurate in its assessment of Hegelian intent, as many scholars have sought to do, an examination of the ways in which the conceptual conflict surrounding Antigone facilitates the fracturing, multiplying, and metamorphosing of identity beyond the unintelligible category “woman” effectively opens up questions of difference and solidarity within feminist community. Feminisms will not fit into a homogenous model of forced consensus, or common identities and purposes, nor should they strive to do so. The intergenerational dialogue I propose advances heterogeneity and dissensus within feminisms; it encourages difference and solidarity in an

intergenerational, but not an intrafamilial dynamic of exchange, as feminisms cast within reproductive phraseology tend to stagnate, as I have argued more vigorously in other writings.³

Beauvoir's Antigone The Tragic Woman, Unveiled

In response to Hegel's treatment of Antigone, Simone de Beauvoir situates Antigone as a paradigmatic figure of womanhood, demonstrative of the special role women play within the family and ethical life in Hegel's *Phenomenology*. As I have asserted elsewhere⁴, Beauvoir's examination of Hegelian themes reveals their insufficiency and sets the stage for future responses. She creates conceptual spaces as she discloses the absurdity, dissonance, and corruption in masculinist cultural assumptions and philosophical conclusions about women. Beauvoir's project is motivated by her desire for women to gain access to the privileges of men – including and especially transcendence. Therefore, she illuminates the apparatus by which women are trapped in immanence and attempts to uncover the means by which women can overcome this secondary status.

At the same time that Beauvoir interrogates masculinist philosophy and its major paradigms, she remains, to some extent, within these parameters. For example, though Beauvoir's concept of freedom is presented in existentialist terms, "transcendence" – the liberty of "becoming" – is conceptually Hegelian: there is no happiness in "being at rest"⁵: "Every subject [...] achieves liberty only through a continual reaching out toward other liberties"⁶. She explains:

There is no justification for present existence other than its expansion into an indefinitely open future. Every time transcendence falls back into immanence, stagnation, there is a degradation of existence into the "*en-soi*" – the brutish life of subjection to given conditions – and of liberty into constraint and contingency.⁷

Beauvoir also chronicles the passage of feminist consciousness through a project of negation and transformation, a dialectical movement of consciousness towards the aim of transcendence similar to the movement of Spirit in Hegel's *Phenomenology*. However, Beauvoir's dialectic

between consciousness and concrete circumstances results in irresolution and an apprehension of possibility itself insufficient for transcendence but pivotal in locating and defying oppressive structures.

In her analysis of marriage, Beauvoir directly addresses Hegel's Antigone. She references the dialectic of particular and universal, or the opposition between human and divine law, in the ethical realm of the *Phenomenology*. She refers to "the very doctrine enunciated by Hegel when he maintains that woman's relations as mother and wife are basically general and not individual"⁸ and notes that only man transcends "toward the universal as worker and citizen"⁹. In Hegel's analysis of the family, woman both represents and is confined to the dark, lower world of shadows – the realm of the family and divine law. Woman is not alienated from nature since she does not experience a confrontation, or contradiction, between herself and first nature, or particularity. She is denied her dialectical development, since this requires the overcoming of natural existence through the conscious risk of death for recognition in the community. Woman is responsible to the family and, thus, unlike men, cannot proceed beyond its realm. Therefore, woman always remains ethical substance without self-consciousness. She only achieves knowledge as intuition of divine law and never achieves the abstract individuality of a citizen; she remains confined to her particularity.

Hegel explains: "But because it is only as a citizen that he is actual and substantial, the individual, so far as he is not a citizen but belongs to the Family, is only an unreal impotent shadow"¹⁰. Since woman is confined to this world of shadows, or the lower world of the family, and remains trapped within the realm of first nature, or particularity, her self-development, or transcendence, is halted. The progression of human consciousness from the particularity of the family to the realization of universality is limited to the male sex. Hegel states:

The brother is the member of the Family in whom its Spirit becomes an individuality which turns towards another sphere, and passes over into the consciousness of universality. The brother leaves this immediate, elemental, and therefore, strictly

speaking, negative ethical life of the Family, in order to acquire and produce the ethical life that is conscious of itself and actual. He passes from the divine law, within whose sphere he lived, over to human law. But the sister becomes, or the wife remains, the head of the household and the guardian of divine law.¹¹

As in the *Phenomenology*, Beauvoir's analysis recognizes the husband's "position of moral and social superiority".¹² She elaborates:

He has the advantage of superior culture or, at any rate, professional training; since adolescence he has taken an interest in world affairs – they are his affairs – he knows something of law, he keeps up with politics, he belongs to a party, to a union, to social organizations; as worker and citizen his thinking is related to action.¹³

For Beauvoir, social rather than natural conditions are the cause of this injustice, or inequality between the sexes. She claims that "the basic inequality still lies in the fact that the husband finds concrete self-realization in work and action [...]"¹⁴, whereas "[women's] miscellaneous information does not constitute culture".¹⁵ Thus, she makes it clear that it is "intellectual technique" women lack – not intellect.¹⁶ The position of women is one of inferiority, yet it is not an insurmountable subjugation since this situation depends on current contexts and rationalizations. It is bad faith, according to Beauvoir, to view the plight of oppressed groups as a fixed state. Earlier in the text, she states that

when an individual (or a group of individuals) is kept in a situation of inferiority, the fact is that he *is* inferior. But the significance of the verb *to be* must be rightly understood here: it is in bad faith to give it a static value when it has the dynamic Hegelian sense of "to have become".¹⁷

Beauvoir reveals that freedom, as it has been manifested in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, is conceptually flawed because it is only available to men, a position often justified in philosophical and other dominant discourses by reigning biological assumptions. Beauvoir presents the situation of woman not simply as an account, but as a process of consciousness in relation to the world and others, elements of which are exposed

to contestation and change through radical problematization. In doing so, Beauvoir may be locating both forces of oppression and forces of subversion in Hegel's text. Her Hegelian project entails a discursive strategy wherein Beauvoir incorporates concepts from Hegelian philosophy and traces woman's consciousness through pivotal Hegelian narratives; she prevents woman from developing an actual independent consciousness in this context, but her own denial of women's subjectivity within Hegelian concepts and narratives differs from Hegel's own denial of the same. Like many feminist writers, Beauvoir views Hegel's text as a point of contestation and revisits this narrative to challenge the symbolic order from within. By drawing out tensions, Beauvoir defies Hegel.

Though Beauvoir demonstrates a degree of commitment to male philosophical thought (even as she reveals situations in need of radical change and mobilizes feminist consciousness with problematizing and destabilizing effects), such issues have given an impetus to ongoing debates. Beauvoir's undertaking has prompted feminists to interrogate the terms of the desired transcendence and the inevitably chiasmic relationship of feminisms with the writings of traditional, masculinist philosophers. Further, her theory of alterity, taken up by Irigaray, facilitates Irigaray's confrontation with Hegel's discussion of ethical order in the *Phenomenology* as central to an understanding of women's place in the Hegelian system and woman's place within phallogocentric culture and society.

Irigaray's Anti-Woman The Challenge of Difference

In contrast to Beauvoir's treatment of Antigone within the Hegelian dialectic, Irigaray both exposes and exploits the position of Antigone/woman as the derivative or lacking subject within a logic of identity that permeates western philosophical thought. As Tina Chanter puts it, "Unlike Beauvoir, Irigaray is not ready to negate the alterity imposed upon women by the Western philosophical tradition without first acknowledging its unplumbed resources".¹⁸ Rather than primarily addressing the inadequacies of the terms of the desired transcendence

for women, or women's inability to share in the privileges of the transcendent subject given the structures of difference, Irigaray asserts difference as a positivity. Though in Debra Bergoffen's view, "[Irigaray] turns a deaf ear to the ways in which *The Second Sex* calls for a transvaluation (not an eradication) of [sexual difference]"¹⁹, Margaret Whitford points out that Irigaray is "trying to *think* sexual difference in the strong sense of the term – to bring into existence the unthought and the unsymbolized [...]"²⁰

Though both Beauvoir and Irigaray address "women's exile from subjectivity," as noted by Naomi Schor within her incisive analysis of the relation of these thinkers²¹, Irigaray departs from Beauvoir with reference to the othering of Antigone/woman and, ultimately, challenges Beauvoir's means of feminist critique. Irigaray's discussion of ethical order in the *Phenomenology* exposes it as the rationale for masculine knowledges which accounts for only one pole of the sexual spectrum, instead of its entirety: There is only one sex; only men can gain access to the privileged or valorized domains of society, while women remain buried within culture, excluded from attaining the status of full humanity or rationality. To Irigaray, the *Phenomenology* represents the logical justification of the exclusion of women from these privileged or valorized realms. Women, by "nature," as it has been assigned to them, may not achieve full humanity through dialectical development.

In *Speculum of the Other Woman*, however, Irigaray identifies and redirects the devalued, oppositional forces of woman, or the feminine, as positive and revolutionary powers.²² In a challenge to the Hegelian dialectical system, Irigaray halts the dialectical movement of the *Phenomenology* and asserts the repressed and devalued power of woman, including woman's jouissance, or repressed desire, against the exploitative, hierarchical, and authoritarian structures of the symbolic order. She invokes a psychosexual specificity derived from culture and society to challenge constructions of "woman" and presumptions surrounding human identity and transforms this key Hegelian philosophical moment. Thus, Irigaray utilizes the position of women within the Hegelian framework as a disruptive force capable of not only uncovering the

flaws therein but further dismantling masculinist logic – that of the Hegelian philosophical apparatus and beyond.

The mode of engagement Irigaray enacts in her discussion of Hegel's ethical realm – namely, the assertion of "difference" characteristic of her early writings – cannot be characterized as accepting or rejecting of Hegel's terms. Rather, Irigaray enters the discursive plane in order to effect a bold corruption, or an explosion, of these terms. Irigaray asserts feminine difference, with all of its negative resonances – absence, defect, lack – as positive precisely because such difference is the unthought, unspoken, and unsymbolized within the realm of masculinist metaphysical dualisms, and as such has the power to delegitimize them. Due to the presumed specificity of women's physiology, for example, the dark, unknown force of "femininity" links women to fluids and fluidity, with being in flux, or having non-identical status; and this creates a disruption within the field of coherence upon which masculinist philosophy has historically relied. In *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*, Irigaray says:

So let me return to the character of Antigone, though I shall not identify with it. Antigone, the antiwoman, is still a production of a culture that has been written by men alone. But this figure, who, according to Hegel, stands for ethics, has to be brought out of the night, out of shadow, out of the rock, out of the total paralysis experienced by a social order that condemns itself even as it condemns her.²³

Hegel's Antigone represents womanhood; she does not fit into societal standards of femininity, and, thus, she is "anti-woman". But she is also "anti-woman" in Irigaray's formulation of difference: that force of subversion capable of undermining the intrinsic structures of phallogocentrism.

Butler's Antigone Queering Dominant Spaces

In *Antigone's Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death*, Butler examines Hegelian and Lacanian uses of *Antigone*, noting that Antigone "concludes the Oedipal drama", but "fails to produce

heterosexual closure for that drama”.²⁴ While Butler prefaces this statement with her suggestion that Antigone is “not quite a queer heroine”²⁵, she acknowledges the potentiality of Antigone to unsettle dominant narratives, such as those of kinship and heteronormativity. She situates Antigone as “caught in a web of relations that produce no coherent position within kinship”²⁶, though “not, strictly speaking, outside of kinship or, indeed, unintelligible”.²⁷ According to Butler, “Kinship is not simply a situation [Antigone] is in but a set of practices that she also performs, relations that are reinstated in time precisely through the practice of their repetition”.²⁸ When she buries her brother, Polyneices, Antigone engages in the performative repetition of kinship, which Butler identifies as a mode of doing, rather than a form of being.²⁹ The structure of Antigone’s kinship relations puzzles or defies the arbitrary but congealed origins of kinship relations, since they are based on relations of incest. Thus, Butler identifies “something like kinship trouble at the heart of Sophocles”.³⁰ Within a broader discussion of gay marriage and the presence of alternative kinship structures, also undertaken in her essay, “Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?”³¹ Butler suggests that kinship norms, like gender norms, provide stable frameworks of cultural intelligibility, and that Antigone, to some extent, disrupts the stability of the ordering practices of kinship.³² As Butler explains, the law of the Father “sets limits upon the variability of social forms” and “in its most conservative form, mandates an exogamic, heterosexual conclusion to the oedipal drama”.³³ This constraint is “understood to be beyond social alteration” and “to constitute the condition and limit of all social alteration”³⁴, as Hegel’s dialectic itself suggests. Butler notes:

Certainly, [Antigone] does not achieve another sexuality, one that is *not* heterosexuality, but she does seem to deinstitutionalize heterosexuality by refusing to do what is necessary to stay alive for Haemon, by refusing to become a mother and a wife, by scandalizing the public with her wavering gender, by embracing death as her bridal chamber [...].³⁵

Thus, Antigone upsets kinship structures because the foundation of her familial bonds

or blood ties are premised on the incest taboo, and she defies compulsory heterosexuality by committing suicide before consummating her marital relation. Tragically, Antigone suffers the fate of others who defy norms and exceed cultural intelligibility. In keeping with other feminist readings, Butler suggests, “Between life and death, she is already living in the tomb prior to any banishment there. Her punishment precedes her crime, and her crime becomes the occasion for its literalization”.³⁶ Butler states, “Prohibited from action, she nevertheless acts, and her act is hardly a simple assimilation to an existing norm”.³⁷ In fact, to the extent that Antigone is viewed as an intentional subject, her political act is often upheld as an expression of her unwavering principles, or a bold, feminist revolt. To what extent does she defy a closed system of identity logic through her very existence within a dialectical progression that sublates difference? To what extent does Antigone, in her “manly” defiance of human law/Creon’s authority and resistance to heteronormative closure ultimately subvert dominant narratives? Insofar as she disrupts the space of Philosophy, unsettling the Hegelian dialectical narrative and the apparatuses of dominant culture, as well as the concomitant space allowed for her by universalistic and heterosexist assumptions about women, including those of masculinist philosophy, she may function as a queer heroine. Alternately, she has emerged for some as a feminist icon.

Conclusion

Three (or More) Moments of Antigone

In any event, the insistent feminist return to Antigone, which I represent in these three feminist moments, somewhat simplified in the interest of brevity, provides a vital locus of contention. These three theoretical moments – where Antigone is a *tragic figure*, trapped in immanence, living something of a death within life but striving towards transcendence; an *antiwoman* who has been written out of such narratives altogether and emerges as an oppositional force of interrogation and disruption; and finally a *potentially queer figure* who destabilizes the ordering practices of normativity and the space of philosophical discourse – may be read

as representative shifts in the articulation of difference and the use of oppositional strategies within feminism. These various treatments of Antigone are by no means the only responses to Hegel or approaches to difference offered by these thinkers, and these moments (described in somewhat coarse outlines, as I have suggested) are not entirely discrete. These moments, in fact, inform one another and intersect in subtle ways. However, each mode offers its own contribution to the formulation of relevant strategies for current and future feminisms, as they may be simultaneously or alternately effective and viable;

- 1) that of inclusion, or the immediate relief from unjust conditions;
- 2) that of strategically asserted otherness, or the expression of what has been denied and repressed;
- 3) that of radical transformation via the questioning and dismantling of the foundational principles and normative frameworks of dominant discursive matrices.

Each of these modes contains elements crucial to refiguring “difference” within feminist practices/knowledges. If we examine the ways in which Antigone, as a point of critical intervention in the work of Beauvoir, Irigaray, and Butler, unsettles the space of feminist identity itself, we may see that each of the intersecting modes offers insights about how we can mobilize around a non-identitarian locus of identity and set of purposes in order to further the aims of feminist critical practices. Placed in communication with one another, these various Antigones refuse to provide a cosy and comfortable space for feminism, but their critical dissonance as well as their overlays create a space that may generate a sense of strength and redirect anxieties about feminisms’ critical substance in productive ways – that is, if we are careful not to engage in some of the problematic approaches entailed in Hegelian dialectical progression.

Though Butler leaves many questions about the queer potential of Antigone open, as do I, examining the debates surrounding *Antigone* as an intergenerational dialogue between Beauvoir, Irigaray, and Butler set in motion herein touches upon a provocative exchange concerning the feminist and queer potential of Antigone, as well as

the effectiveness of feminist responses to Hegel’s Antigone, issues that continue to resonate within current feminist scholarship. It is an ongoing and lively dialogue, indeed, only a glimpse of which I have provided here. Alongside, or within it, critical appraisals of diverse modes of feminist theory and praxis emerge. Such a dialogue stands in contrast to ineffective, and, in some cases, calumnious, attacks taking place within feminist discourse, based on anxieties about the failure or passing on of feminism, wherein feminists take on the modes and mechanisms of problematic mastertexts. Some adopt prevailing generational rhetoric which reinstitutes age stratification and, oftentimes, ageism; heterosexism; dominant notions of intellectual debt; and the strict historical periods inscribed by a concept of linear, chronological time. In so doing, feminists have often obscured “generational” differences within the terms of belonging and affect. This has tended to stagnate discussions within the same discursive limits and destructive narratives that feminisms have sought to transform or dismantle. Therefore, it is crucial that we recognize differences within feminism in political, theoretical, and methodological terms. Only when we engage in dialogue in this way may we begin to formulate effective approaches to issues.

Negotiating this terrain provides a significant challenge to feminisms mired in dominant thinking. Given our longstanding habits, critics have fallen into these unproductive patterns when positioning feminist thinkers in relation to one another. Debra Bergoffen notes, for example, that Irigaray fails to think through her “genealogical debt” to Beauvoir.³⁸ She claims that “because Irigaray reads Beauvoir as an uncomplicated ‘equality’ feminist, she positions herself and Beauvoir as oppositional thinkers”.³⁹ “I think,” she continues, “that this is both mistaken and unfortunate because it simplifies the differences between her and Beauvoir and repeats the all too familiar philosophical gesture of negating the other”.⁴⁰ While Bergoffen’s impulse is to defy narratives of combat and destruction within and between feminist positionalities, she has imported the terms of intellectual ownership and debt intrinsic to masculinist models of intellectual inheritance, even as she identifies the importance of reading these figures genealogi-

cally. Bergoffen further notes, “I do not intend to reduce Irigaray to an echo of Beauvoir. Genealogical relationships are transformative not repetitive”.⁴¹ This is an important statement about the intersections of feminist thought. However, too often the operative sense of genealogy in conversations about feminisms conveys a sense of reproductive history as well as a vision of arborescent knowledge and intellectual debt. Karen Green, in noting the “continuities as well as discontinuities” between Beauvoir and Irigaray, mentions Irigaray’s disappointment that Beauvoir never responded to Irigaray’s gesture of sending Beauvoir a copy of *Speculum of the Other Woman* – the title of which, in Green’s words, “announces a debt to [Beauvoir]”.⁴² She states, “The daughter (or little sister) did not get the recognition she desired”.⁴³ Similarly, Lisa Walsh, in “Her Mother Her Self: The Ethics of the Antigone Family Romance,” states, “And if, for all this, we were to begin at the beginning. With the mother. Her uniqueness and her femininity. Her womanhood and her desire. And the enormity of our debt to her”.⁴⁴ Each of these remarks in some way collapses the genealogical, whereas feminisms should actively question and attempt to cast aside notions of feminist familial bonds and a prevailing sense of intellectual ownership or debt. It is more politically effective to trace our genealogical connections in a Foucauldian sense and to follow the lead of Deleuze and Guattari, shifting our vision of intellectual development away from the linear, unified oneness of the phallic tree and towards a less hierarchical, singular model. As Antigone herself has demonstrated, silencing is constitutive of any logic of oneness.

By allowing points of contention to mobilize feminist critical practices, we utilize all of the strategies of feminism that are effective at a given moment: egalitarian, radical, deconstructive, visionary. Argument and dissent are necessary to adequate political theorizing and organizing, but productive dialogue demands that feminists acknowledge the subtleties of various positions, steer clear of annihilating dynamics, and form coalitions based on effective strategies. The assertion of age-stratifying brackets, discrete periods of chronological time, or models of change based on conquest and domination/sublation and the

repetition of patterns of intellectual ownership and debt are not conducive to such feminist intergenerational dialogue. Our critiques of Hegel suggest that as feminists we must position ourselves in different terms. Further, we must acknowledge the radical alterity of feminisms. We may enjoy a shared set of purposes, but not a group identity or collective mind. We may not reach consensus – either about the figure of Antigone or about the machinations of feminisms – but dissensus can inspire ideas or collaborations we have not yet envisioned. Antagonisms within feminisms not only suggest that feminists are simply not kin to one another, in many senses, but that feminisms are alive and well, contrary to the plentitude of despair within feminist scholarship concerning the failure or passing on of feminism.

Feminists will never fully agree with one another; and that is a positive sign. However, we may continue to incisively and collectively interrogate concepts of politics and community without the dream of a big happy feminist family, a construct that leads not only to disappointment but to the reiteration of power hierarchies or relations of domination that feminisms contest. Further, conformity and homogeneity would ossify feminisms. The demands of political order and coherence in a given moment may suggest that we repress difference, but we must keep in mind that we now have the theoretical resources to forge a synthesis without erasure – to create a mobile assortment of feminist approaches that allow us to adjust our liberatory strategies to suit our needs and shifting agendas.

Feminisms that are plural, fluid, dynamic, and responsive to changing conditions will incorporate the lesson of each Antigone, in an effort to formulate revolutionary practices with neither an ultimate end nor a moment of definitive success in terms of conflict and resolution. Such mobile feminisms will defy a conceptual moment resembling Hegel’s reconciliation, or *Aufhebung*, which enacts discursive violence against Antigone, women, the feminine, the subject of marginality, ... and stifles our capacity for discord and subversion. Feminisms mindful of the shifting and contested space of Antigone will cultivate the irreducible tensions that continue to expand our thinking and enhance the

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effectiveness of feminist critical practices. Butler has contributed to the dialogue surrounding Antigone in vital ways, but this moment of discursive difference should not be mistaken for an arrival point, but rather a gathering of resources and a locus of assessment, analysis, and debate; it is ultimately a departure, into a realm of new Antigones as yet unimagined.

The preceding is based on a presentation delivered at the “The Politics of Being”: *Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy Annual Conference*, Sydney, Australia, June, 15-17, 2005, titled: “‘Unnatural’ Communities of Feminist Resistance: Queering Antigone and Refiguring Difference through Beauvoir, Irigaray, and Butler”.

Notes

1 For further elaboration of my views on intergenerational dialogue, see Jennifer Purvis, “Grrrls and Women Together in the Third Wave: Embracing the Challenges of Intergenerational Feminism(s),” *NWSA Journal* 16:3 (2004): 93-123 and “A ‘Time’ for Change: Negotiating the Space of a Third Wave Political Moment,” *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy* 5 :1 (2005): 6-10.

2 Julia Kristeva, “Women’s Time,” trans. Alice Jardine and Harry Blake, *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 7:1 (1981): 13-35.

3 Purvis, “Grrrls” and “Time”.

4 Jennifer Purvis, “Hegelian Dimensions of *The Second Sex*: A Feminist Consideration,” *Bulletin de la société américaine de philosophie de langue française* (Special issue on Simone de Beauvoir’s *Le deuxième sexe*) 13 :1 (2003): 128-56.

5 Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, trans. H. M. Parshley (New York: Vintage, 1989), xl.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., xli.

8 Ibid., 435.

9 Ibid.

10 G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977), 270.

11 Ibid., 275.

12 Beauvoir, 463.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., 480.

15 Ibid., 463.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., xxxvi.

18 Tina Chanter, *Ethics of Eros: Irigaray’s Rewriting of the Philosophers* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 81.

19 Debra Bergoffen, “Failed Friendship, Forgotten Genealogies: Simone de Beauvoir and Luce Irigaray,” *Bulletin de la société américaine de philosophie de langue française* (Special issue on Simone de Beauvoir’s *Le deuxième sexe*) 13 :1 (2003): 17.

20 Margaret Whitford, *Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine* (Lon-

don: Routledge, 1991), 5.

21 Naomi Schor, “This Essentialism Which Is Not One: Coming to Grips with Irigaray,” *Engaging With Irigaray: Feminist Philosophy and Modern European Thought*, ed. Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor, and Margaret Whitford, (New York: Columbia UP, 1994), 57-78.

22 Luce Irigaray, “The Eternal Irony of the Community,” *Speculum of the Other Woman*, trans. Gillian C. Gill, (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985), 214-26.

23 Luce Irigaray, *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*, trans. Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill, (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993), 118-19.

24 Judith Butler, *Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death*, (New York: Columbia U P, 2000), 74.

25 Ibid., 72.

26 Ibid., 57.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 57-58.

29 Ibid., 58.

30 Ibid., 62.

31 Judith Butler, “Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?” *differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 13:1 (2002): 14-44.

32 Butler, *Antigone’s Claim*, 70.

33 Ibid., 75.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., 76.

36 Ibid., 77.

37 Ibid., 82.

38 Bergoffen, “Failed Friendship,” 17.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., 29.

42 Karen Green, “The Other as Another Other,” *Hypatia* 17:4 (2002): 2.

43 Ibid., 2.

44 Lisa Walsh, “Her Mother Her Self: The Ethics of the Antigone Family Romance,” *Hypatia* 14:3 (1999): 120.

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